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Abstract
In this paper I investigate the co-evolution of fast and slow strategy spread and game strategies in pop-
ulations of spatially distributed agents engaged in a one oﬀ evolutionary dilemma game. Agents are
characterized by a pair of traits, a game strategy (cooperate or defect) and a binary ‘advertising’ strategy
(advertise or don’t advertise). Advertising, which comes at a cost a, allows investment into faster propa-
gation of the agents traits to adjacent individuals. Importantly, game strategy and advertising strategy
are subject to the same evolutionary mechanism. Via analytical reasoning and numerical simulations I
demonstrate that a range of advertising costs exists, such that the prevalence of cooperation is signiﬁ-
cantly enhanced through co-evolution. Linking costly replication to the success of cooperators exposes a
novel co-evolutionary mechanism that might contribute towards a better understanding of the origins of
cooperation-supporting heterogeneity in agent populations.
Author Summary
Almost all common evolutionary explanations why cooperative strategies can survive in populations re-
volve around assortment that enables interactions with similar strategies to occur more often than with
random individuals. A frequently studied example how such assortment can be provided is through
spatially distributed populations. Recent research has shown that cooperative strategies can receive a
large boost in such situations if the population is heterogeneous, i.e. some individuals are more eﬀective
in passing on their strategies than others. However, one might wonder how such heterogeneity can be
explained in the ﬁrst place. In this paper I provide a coherent framework if and under which condi-
tions heterogeneity in abilities to pass on strategies can co-evolve with game strategies by evolutionary
mechanisms. I demonstrate that support for cooperation through co-evolution is possible, if advantages
for passing on strategies are so costly, that they are only cost-eﬀective for cooperative strategies which
beneﬁt from assortment.
Introduction
Cooperative behaviour – acting for the beneﬁt of the group even if not in the immediate interest of the
individual – is common in life. Examples are found in many simple and more complex organisms, ranging
from bacteria in microﬁlms [1] up to humans and human society (see e.g. [2]). Explaining the emergence
and sustainability of cooperation has attracted considerable interest over the last decades. Previous
approaches typically use the framework of evolutionary game theory [3] that describes the spread of
strategies in populations of individuals engaged in prototypical dilemma situations. Reproductive success
is determined by payoﬀs which depend on an individual’s strategy and on the strategies of its interaction
partners.
One of the most often studied dilemmas in this context is the prisoner’s dilemma. Two individuals
are simultaneously faced with a choice between two options, “C” (for cooperate) and “D” (for defect).
Mutual cooperation is rewarded with a payoﬀ of R. Defectors playing against cooperators receive the
temptation to defect T while cooperators are paid the “sucker’s” payoﬀ S in these interactions. Last,
mutual defection results in a payoﬀ P, the punishment for mutual defection, for both players. Payoﬀs are2
ranked T > R > P > S and T < 2R such that irrespective of an opponent’s choice an individual is best
oﬀ by playing D. Hence the Nash equilibrium is (D,D) with a group payoﬀ of 2P which is inferior to
the social optimum of 2R that could be achieved by playing (C,C). How then can cooperative behaviour
be explained?
An approach that has found much attention in recent years is to consider evolutionary games in
structured populations [4]. In this way, for instance, a spatially distributed population can support coop-
eration [5]. The basic cooperation-supporting mechanism is network reciprocity (see [6] for a classiﬁcation
of cooperation-supporting mechanisms), i.e. strategies assort in space such that clusters of cooperators
can shield cooperation against the invasion of defection. The basic ﬁndings of [5] for the prisoner’s
dilemma have been extended in many ways, e.g. by considering the eﬀects of asynchronicity [7], various
forms of noise [8–11], and payoﬀ structures other than the prisoner’s dilemma game [12,13].
More recently, also the evolution of cooperation on complex networks [14–16] has become a major
ﬁeld of study. The prevailing ﬁnding is that heterogeneity in network structure can strongly enhance the
support for cooperation. This eﬀect is due to the role of hub nodes as cooperation leaders [15,17]. Hub
nodes have many more opportunities to play the game (and hence generate payoﬀ) than average nodes.
Consequently, they tend to impose their strategies on adjacent nodes. Then, if a hub node was a defector,
it would quickly undermine its position by surrounding itself with defectors, whereas it would reinforce its
position when following a cooperate strategy. This basic eﬀect of heterogeneity on cooperation can also
be observed on regular or spatial networks when other heterogeneity in agent properties is introduced.
Examples of this type of model are models of learning and teaching [18–20] or models that consider
diﬀerential abilities of agents to generate payoﬀ [21–23].
Whether assuming a scale-free network topology as in [15], a distribution of learning and teaching
abilities as in [18], or quenched stochasticity in payoﬀ structures as in [21], all the above studies presuppose
a ﬁxed heterogeneous system structure. Such an assumption can be reasonable if (e.g. environmental)
processes unrelated to the evolutionary dilemma game shape system structure. However, it remains an
important question to investigate how system structure and strategies can co-evolve to create the dynamic
patterns that allow for cooperation to survive (see [24] for a review on that topic). Most prominently this
question has been addressed in the context of adaptive networks and cooperation [17,25–27]. Other studies
have investigated mechanisms for the coevolution of teaching or learning abilities and cooperation [28–30].
This work typically relies either on reasonable ad-hoc rules [29,30] or on a dynamics of system structure
that is similar to Hebbian learning [31]: i.e. what is successful remains (as in the case of co-evolutionary
network models [17,25–27]) or becomes stronger (as e.g. in the context of [28]). Whereas such a combined
dynamics can explain the co-evolution of strategies and cooperation-supporting structure, the dynamics
of system structure is not subject to an evolutionary dynamics itself. Previous models like [17,25–30]
might thus be suitable in the context of human learning (or for any types of more sophisticated agents),
but would be problematic in the context of very simple biological organisms.
To explain this point in more detail, consider a model of teaching and learning developed in [18]. The
study investigates a setup in which two types of agents (e.g. teachers and learners) are subject to an
evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma on a 2d spatial grid. Agent types are assumed to be ﬁxed and cooperation
is supported by the implied heterogeneity in strategy adaptation speed. Now consider a scenario in which
agents’ teaching/learning abilities (or ‘advertising’ abilities as I will call them subsequently) are passed
on together with their game strategies. What would be observed is that the teaching trait will spread
in the population, thus reducing heterogeneity and hence removing the support for cooperation. This
raises the question: Can evolutionary processes that govern the dynamics of both strategy and teaching
trait give rise to the necessary heterogeneity to support cooperation? In this paper I will follow previous
studies as [32,33] that modelled individual trait selection in the prisoner’s dilemma game to address this
topic. I demonstrate that the answer to this question is yes, but only provided that the advertising trait
is costly and costs of advertising are within a certain range.
Subsequently I consider ‘advertising’ as an agent-speciﬁc ability to enhance its chances of strategy3
propagation. This may be understood in a social context as an individuals persuasiveness (or eﬀort to
persuade others to imitate it). In a biological context ‘advertising’ may be linked to an investment into
replication that comes at a cost, or may be interpreted as a form of signalling that enhances an individual’s
chance of being imitated. However, note a crucial diﬀerence to models of cheaptalk, green beard-type
signalling and the evolution of cooperation [34–36]. The present model does not allow sophisticated
agents that have the ability to play strategies that discriminate between game partners’ signals. Rather,
signals promote the replication of strategies when present.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section starts with a description of the model and the
typical setup of simulation experiments. Section presents analytical results for the well-mixed case and
then proceeds with a numerical analysis of the evolutionary game in space. The generality of results and
the wider context are analyzed at the end of the results section and in the ﬁnal section of the paper.
Methods
I consider a set of N agents distributed on a 2d spatial L × L square lattice with periodic boundary
conditions. Adjacency relationships are deﬁned by von Neumann neighbourhoods. Agents are engaged
in the one-oﬀ prisoner’s dilemma, play pure strategies, either s = 0 (for defect) or s = 1 (for cooperate),
and receive payoﬀs depending on game outcomes. Following a large part of the literature I parametrize







1 + r 0
￿
, (1)
such that the parameter 0 ≤ r ≤ 1 classiﬁes the dilemma strength.
Additional to game strategies, agents have a trait σ that determines their ‘advertising’ strategy.
Hence, four possible strategy combinations: advertising cooperators (CA), non-advertising cooperators
(C), advertising defectors (DA) and non-advertising defectors (D) are possible. An agent with σ = 1
advertises, such that it has a by an amount b > 0 enhanced chance of being selected as a reference agent
for strategy updating. Agents with σ = 0 still have a chance of being selected as a reference, but this
chance is smaller than the chance of being selected as an advertiser. Advertising is costly and an agent
that advertises will have a cost a > 0 deducted from its payoﬀ before strategy updating.
More speciﬁcally, the following algorithm is implemented for the evolution of game strategy s and
advertising trait σ:
• In a typical experiment the system is seeded with a random allocation of 50% cooperators and 50%
defectors. Both cooperators and defectors are equally likely to advertise or not. In some cases, in
particular for large beneﬁt of advertising, otherwise stable phases can not evolve out of randomly
allocated initial conditions. In such cases I initialize simulations by a correlated arrangement of the
four strategies such that like types cluster. Long term solutions do not depend on speciﬁcs of these
initial arrangements.
• A focus agent i is chosen at random. Amongst the focus agent’s neighbours a reference agent
is chosen probabilistically such that agents with the advertising strategy trait have an enhanced







where Aij is the adjacency matrix of the contact network and ki =
P
j Aij is the degree of node i.




j of both the focus and the reference agent are calculated from games
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• In a next step strategies are updated according to Fermi-pairwise updating. Accordingly, with
probability






agent i copies the strategy traits (both game and advertising strategies) from agent j. The parameter
κ in Eq. (4) gives the intensity of noise in strategy updating and is set to κ = 0.1 for all of the
following simulation experiments.
• Steps 2,3, and 4 are iterated till a quasistationary state is reached and then equilibrium concentra-
tions of the four strategy combinations: advertising cooperators nca, non-advertising cooperators
nd, advertising defectors nda, and non-advertising defectors nd are determined as averages over a
suﬃcient number of further iterations.
In all following experiments system sizes from N = 100 × 100 up to 800 × 800 have been considered
and system sizes were increased as required close to transition points.
The above model setup diﬀers slightly from the setup of the orginal model of learning and teaching
developed in [18] in which learning or teaching abilities are included as an agent-speciﬁc prefactor in the
strategy transmission rates in Eq. (4). The purpose of the present setup is to make the role of advertising
more explicit in the way agents select reference partners. Very similar results to the ones presented below
can be obtained for models in which advertising is directly included as a prefactor to Eq. (4) and the
probabilistic reference partner selection step is omitted.
Results
The advertising game
To understand the eﬀect of advertising in combination with an evolutionary dilemma game, it is instruc-
tive to gain insights into the incentives for advertising in a well-mixed population. Let us consider a
population composed of two types of agents, ‘advertisers’ (concentration n0) and non-advertisers (con-
centration n1 = 1−n0). Payoﬀ diﬀerences are then determined by the cost of advertising a and I assume
that strategy concentrations in the population evolve according to Eq.s (2) and (4). In the limit of large
systems, the evolution of concentrations is governed by
˙ n0 = n1P(1 → 0) − n1P(0 → 1), (5)
where
P(1 → 0) =
n0





P(0 → 1) =
(b + 1)n1




are the transition probabilities that an advertiser changes its strategy to non-advertising or vice versa.
The ﬁrst factors in Eq.s (6) and (7) give the probability of selecting an agent of the other type as a
reference and the second factors give the probabilities of adopting the other types’ strategy once the type
has been selected as a reference. Combining Eq.s (5), (6) and (7) and straightforward manipulation gives
a criterion for a critical cost of advertising ac
ac = κln(b + 1), (8)
such that advertising is not viable in a well-mixed population if a > ac and dominates the entire population
if a < ac.5
A viscous population structure does not give any additional beneﬁt for either advertisers or non-
advertisers and only slows down the diﬀusion of strategies. Accordingly, one would expect the criterion
(8) to hold on spatial lattices as well. This has been conﬁrmed by simulation experiments (data not
shown).
Advertising and cooperation in well-mixed populations
Consider the coevolution of advertising trait σ and game strategy s in a well-mixed population. In this
setup two regimes must be distinguished. For cheap advertsing (a < ac) it can easily be shown that
irrespective of the composition of the population net transition rates from any species in the population
to advertising defectors are positive. Hence, nda = 1 is a stable equlibrium point and cooperation is not
sustainable. For expensive advertising a > ac net transition rates from any species to non-advertising
defectors are positive and hence nd = 1 is a stable ﬁxed point. Similar arguments show that for a = ac
any composition of advertising and non-advertising defectors with nd + nda = 1 is a stable equilibrium
point. Unsurprisingly, one concludes that advertising cannot facilitate stable cooperation in well-mixed
populations.
Results in structured populations
The above arguments change in structured populations, on which network reciprocity favours positive
assortment of strategies. When network reciprocity is present, it is advantageous for cooperators to
surround themselves with the same strategy. Hence there is a beneﬁt to a cooperator to invest in
‘advertising’ that surpasses the threshold cost ac obtained from the cost-beneﬁt analysis of the advertising
game in the absence of a dilemma situation. Clearly also, this beneﬁt of cooperators of surrounding
themselves by like types is limited. One thus also expects an upper threshold cost of advertising a
(2)
c such
that advertising for cooperators is no longer viable for a > a
(2)
c .
The situation is diﬀerent for defectors. Defectors don’t gain from surrounding themselves with like
types. Hence, the threshold for the viability of advertising for defectors is the same as for the advertising
game alone, i.e. given by Eq. (8). Both arguments let one surmise that there must be a range of
advertising costs ac < a < a
(2)
c such that advertising is proﬁtable for cooperators but not to defectors.
Spatial arrangements of strategies add a further dimension to the problem. Consider the range of
costs ac < a < a
(2)
c in which advertising is viable for cooperators, but not for defectors. Defectors close to
cooperators can achieve very high payoﬀs, but payoﬀs of defectors surrounded by other defectors are poor.
Similar to results on volunteering [37,38], this leads to a cyclical dominance between strategies that allows
for coexistence in spatial settings. In particular, in ‘tough’ games with r > r
(0)
c , advertising defectors
can outcompete advertising cooperators. However, the cost of advertising can disadvantage advertising
defectors in direct competition with non-advertising defectors. Further, advertising cooperators may be
able to invade groups of non-advertising defectors, when the cost of advertising is not too large, thus
creating a cyclical dominance. For large r > r
(0)
c non-advertising cooperators never play a role: They are
always outcompeted by all other strategies and are not expected to be found in the population.
In the following, I verify and extend the above arguments by numerical simulation experiments. The
panels in Fig, 1 show data for the dependence of the concentrations of the four strategies in the population
on the dilemma strength r for b = 3 and κ = 0.1. For better visualization, the panels of Fig. 2 illustrate
some typical snapshots of arrangements of cooperators and defectors for interesting parameter regions
and give support for the above arguments about the cyclical dominance of advertising and non-advertising
defectors and advertising cooperators. Fig. 1 explores various regimes of advertising cost parameters a.
Panel (a) characterizes the regime a = 0.1 < ac in which advertising is viable for both cooperators and
defectors. As a result, only advertising cooperators and defectors survive and the diagram reproduces
the known phase diagram with a very low extinction threshold for cooperation at rc = 0.02112(1) [38].6
Similarly, panel (d) gives data for a = 1 > a
(2)
c , a scenario in which advertising is not viable for both
strategies and again the known phase diagram is reproduced.
As argued above, the intermediate interval ac < a < a
(2)
c is of more interest, cf. panels (b) and (c).
Three observations stand out: i) coexistence of all four strategies appears only possible in a small interval
of dilemma strengths below the known extinction threshold rc = 0.02112(1). In particular for larger
advertising cost, advertsing cooperators only become viable once the dilemma strength exceeds some
threshold. Likewise, in the absence of advertising cooperators for low r, advertising defectors cannot
exist and only become viable at the same threshold dilemma strength at which advertising cooperators
appear.
ii) Increasing the dilemma strength beneﬁts advertising defectors, provided non-advertising coopera-
tors are still in the population. Once these have died out (for very low dilemma strength), increasing r
further increases the rates at which advertising defectors invade advertising cooperators and slows down
the rate at which advertising cooperators invade non-advertising defectors. The result is a slow decrease
in the numbers of advertising cooperators and a strong increase in concentrations of non-advertising
defectors which also eﬀect a strong decrease in the numbers of advertising defectors. Hence, further
increases in r ﬁrst drive advertising defectors into extinction, resulting in a co-existence regime of adver-
tising cooperators and non-advertising defectors, cf. the phase diagram in the a-r plane in Fig. 3. The
extinction of advertising defectors may allow for a recovery in the population of cooperators, but further
increases of r gradually reduce survival chances for advertising cooperators.
As one would expect from previous work on cyclical dominance between three strategies [37,38], wave-
like patterns and oscillations are found in the regime in which the strategies CA, DA, and D coexist. Some
simulation results that demonstrate this are illustrated in Fig. 5. Panel (a) visualizes simulation data for
the dependence of the concentration of advertising cooperators and the maxima and minima of oscillations
on the cost of advertising. Towards the lower end of cost parameters amplitudes of oscillations are very
large. Amplitudes decline when the cost of advertising is increased and advertising defectors decrease in
numbers. Eventually, the extinction threshold of advertising defectors at a = 0.200(1) marks the end of
the parameter regime in which oscillations can occur. Panel (b) shows some typical timeseries of all three
species in the regime that supports oscillations. It should, however, be noted that because invasions at
various places will increasingly compensate each other when the system size is increased, the amplitudes
of these oscillations is a declining function of system size. This contrasts spatially synchronized patterns
that have, e.g., been observed in [39].
iii) Cyclical dominance and the suppression of advertising defectors at large dilemma strengths replace
the competition between cooperators and defectors by a competition between advertising cooperators and
non-advertising defectors. The mechanism results in a considerable extension of the range of dilemma
strenths for which cooperation can survive. This range is particularly large for small costs of advertising
just at the threshold cost given by Eq. (8) and decreases linearly with costs, cf. also the phase diagram
for b = 3 and κ = 0.1 in Fig. 3.
The full phase diagram in the a − r plane given in Fig. 3 shows that regimes exists in which various
combinations of the four strategies can co-exist. Several of the transitions between such regimes are
discontinuous. One example is the transition DA → CA + DA + D at the sharp cutoﬀ point deﬁned
by Eq. (8). Another example is the transition CA + DA → C + DA which is the result of an indirect
territorial battle of CA and C, similar to what has been described in the context of adaptive rewarding
for public goods games [40,41]. In the case presented here, the outcome of the competition of CA and C
to invade DA deﬁnes the transition point. Similarly, also the transitions C + DA → CA + C + DA + D
and CA + C + DA + D → C + D have been found to be discontinuous.
It is of interest how the size of the cooperation-supporting region depends on the two parameters cost
of advertising a and beneﬁt of advertising b that characterize the coevolutionary advertising game. The
panels belonging to Fig. 4 illustrate simulation results addressing this question. In panel (a), maximum
and minimum costs required for cooperation to survive are given. One notes, that the lower bound agrees7
very well with the logarithmic dependence predicted by Eq. (8). In contrast, the upper boundary has
a step-like dependence on the beneﬁt of advertising. Whereas a cooperation-supporting range of costs
exists for every value of b, the size of the region increases markedly at b ≈ 2. At the same threshold there
is also a jump in the range of dilemma strengths at which cooperation can survive, see panel (b). This
indicates that cooperation beneﬁts when advertising becomes more eﬀective. However, in ﬁnite systems
this is not necessarily the case. In particular for large b in cost regions in which advertising defectors
can survive, amplitudes of the oscillations in cooperator and defector populations can become very large
such that advertising cooperators can often go extinct when absorbing boundaries are hit.
Robustness
How sensitive to changes in model structure is the cooperation-supporting eﬀect of advertising? In this
section I will brieﬂy comment on a number of important factors.
First, I note that noise, i.e. an even only small but non-vanishing chance of passing on a strategy
that is less successful than the strategy of the focus agent, is essential for the mechanism to operate.
In fact, for κ = 0 transmission probabilities in Eq. (4) become step-like, strategy propagation becomes
deterministic and advertising is never viable. On the other hand, when κ > 0 advertising can always
support cooperation. Simulations indicate that the support for cooperation is maximized the smaller
the amount of noise. In the light of the importance of noise for advertising to be successful, it remains
an interesting question whether an equivalent of the underlying mechanism can be found for strategy
replication mechanisms other than Fermi-pairwise updating, like e.g. the replicator dynamics.
A second comment is in order about the binary nature of strategies in the present model. One might
wonder, if cooperation could be supported if the advertising trait was a continuous variable. Preliminary
simulations indicate that this is indeed the case, but the viable amounts of advertising between advertising
defectors and cooperators would vary. Detailed results about this model will be reported elsewhere.
Third, outcomes of evolutionary simulations can depend critically on the updating scheme, e.g.
whether one chooses synchronous or asynchronous updating [7]. The diﬀerence between both schemes
tends to be not so important for probabilistic models like the one discussed in this paper. Experiments
with a parallel updating scheme show that principal results are robust with regard to the choice of up-
dating scheme. In fact, synchronous updating appears to enhance the regime in which cooperation is
supported.
A fourth point worth noting is that the support for cooperation from advertising is not only due
to a cyclical dominance mechanism between three strategies. A prototypical phase diagram for not
too large beneﬁt of advertising like the one of Fig. 3 will always contain a large region in which the
usual competition between cooperators and defectors is replaced by a competition between advertising
cooperators and non-advertising defectors. In this regime cooperation can maximally exploit investments
into surrounding themselves by cooperators which is a strategy that is not viable for defectors.
One might wonder if the investment into advertising would not obliterate the beneﬁts of cooperation?
A quick back of the envelope calculation shows that this is typically not necessarily case. For an estimate
of the social beneﬁts of advertising, compare the social payoﬀs of a pair of advertising cooperators and a
pair of non-advertising defectors. In the ﬁrst case, a group payoﬀ of 2(1−a) is achieved and in the second
case one has a payoﬀ of zero. Hence advertising is overall beneﬁcial if it can lend support to cooperation
for a < 1. A comparison with Eq. (8) shows that this imposes a limit on b and one obtains the rough
estimate of b < e1/κ − 1 for advertising to be socially beneﬁcial. Fig. 4 illustrates that this estimate is
well below the threshold-value of b ≈ 2 and thus the viable region in a − b parameter space is rather
large and will become the larger the smaller the amount of noise κ in strategy propagation. In contrast
to the above, in the regime a < ac in which advertising is beneﬁcial for both cooperators and defectors
advertising is not socially beneﬁcial and may assume the character of an arms race between cooperators
and defectors.8
A further point worth mentioning is the importance of the mechanism by which advertising and game
strategies are inherited. The present model assumes that both strategy components are passed on at the
same time and there is no separation of timescales between the spread of the game and the advertising
strategies. This is in fact a crucial assumption and some exploratory simulation experiments show that
the support for cooperation is reduced markedly if this condition is relaxed.
Last, it is worth remarking that the success of advertising for cooperators is not limited to the two-
player version of the prisoner’s dilemma game. Preliminary results show that a very similar mechanism
can also operate in the public goods game.
Discussion
In this paper I have discussed ‘advertising’ as a mechanism by which agents can make a costly investment
into faster strategy propagation in evolutionary dilemma games in space. Importantly, both strategy
components, advertising and game strategy, are subject to the same evolutionary dynamics and their in-
terplay can co-create dynamic patterns of fast and slow strategy propagators that can sustain cooperation
far beyond the regime in which cooperation is supported by network reciprocity in the standard spatial
evolutionary game. An important requirement for this extension of the support for cooperation is an
appropriate choice of advertising costs. Since cooperators gain support by surrounding themselves with
like strategies, advertising can beneﬁt cooperators more than defectors. Hence advertising needs to be
so costly that it becomes unviable for defectors, but should be below another threshold that demarcates
the maximum beneﬁt for cooperators.
A careful analysis of the costs and beneﬁts of advertising reveals that such a regime always exists,
provided that strategy propagation is subject to noise which occasionally allows inferior strategies to be
copied. I have discussed that support for cooperation by advertising is robust and advertising can be
socially beneﬁcial for the group, provided that the beneﬁts of advertising are not too large.
As a more general aside, advertising essentially introduces a second game on top of the original
dilemma situation. The essence of this second game is competition for an accelerated rate of strategy
propagation. Considering this game as standalone, advertising could be interpreted as a defect strategy,
because it leads to inferior group payoﬀs compared to non-advertising. However, in the combined game
in structured populations a linkage disequilibrium develops. Cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game
associates with the defect strategy in the advertising game, whereas defect in the prisoner’s dilemma
associates with a cooperate strategy in the advertising game. Interestingly, payoﬀs achieved in the
combined game can be larger than in the standalone prisoner’s dilemma game.
The present model serves two purposes. First, by demonstrating that even if subject to the same
evolutionary dynamics a trait that marks heterogeneity in strategy spread (i.e. the advertising strategy)
and cooperation can co-evolve it addresses a gap in the current literature. Second, by pointing out that
costly replication can support cooperation, it may point to a more general mechanism that might lead to
some interesting directions for future work.
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Figure 1. Dependence of stationary strategy concentrations of C,D,CA and DA on r for an
advertising beneﬁt of b = 3.0 and κ = 0.1. (a) Cost of advertising a = 0.1: DA and CA dominate.
(b) a = 0.3. All four strategies coexist until C dies out at r = 0.02. CA, D and DA coexist until DA
dies out at r = 0.045. Finally, CA coexists with D and CA dies out at r = 0.1599 (c) a = 0.5. For
r < 0.009 no advertising is found. All four strategies coexist in varying proportions for
0.009 < r < 0.016. For 0.016 < r < 0.03 CA and DA and D coexist. For 0.03 < r < 0.0935 CA and D





Figure 2. Example 100 × 100 lattice conﬁgurations for a = 0.5 and b = 3 (κ = 0.1).
(Non-advertising) defectors (D) are white, advertising defectors (DA) magenta, non-advertising
cooperators (C) blue and advertising cooperators black (CA).(a) r = 0.005 coexistence of C and D. (b)
r = 0.013 Coexistence of all four types. (c) r = 0.022 Coexistence of D, DA and CA. The spatial
organisation of the clusters makes it quite clear that advertising defectors invade clusters of advertising
cooperators, but are beaten by non-advertising defectors. Advertising cooperators can invade


















Figure 3. Phase diagram for the entire space of dilemma strengths and advertising costs

































Figure 4. Cost boundaries and maximum support for cooperation. (a) Cost boundaries within
which cooperation ﬁnds additional support by advertising. Open symbols represent simulation data on
a 400 × 400 torus using κ = 0.1. Error bars are about the size of the symbols. The dashed line is
plotted using Eq. (8), the solid line is a guide for the eye and the dotted line demarcates the region of
advertising costs in which advertising can be socially beneﬁcial (see text). (b) Extinction threshold at
































Figure 5. Oscillations in the dynamics of advertising cooperators, advertising defectors
and non-advertising defectors in simulations on a 800 × 800 torus for κ = 0.1 and b = 3. (a)
Dependence of the average (solid dots) and maximum and minimum values of the CA population on the
cost of advertising. For low cost, amplitudes of the oscillations become very large such that species can
go extinct. At a ≈ 0.200(1) advertising defectors become extinct. This threshold also demarcates the
regime of oscillatory dynamics. (b) Timeseries of the evolution of the normalized concentrations of the
three species for a = 0.152. Initial transients have been omitted.